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 1.  304 U.S. 64 (1938).   Except, of course, federal maritime and patent torts, see Yamaha
Motor Corp.  v.  Calhoun,  516 U.S. 199  (1996).  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in that case 
and her question to the author during the oral argument of Elman, post at p. 19,  are the
basis for both the title and the structure of this essay..
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Justice Brennan’s first impulse, when he came to write  New York Times v.
Sullivan, was to federalize the law of defamation.  He would do that by making the
question of whether the words are defamatory a federal constitutional question.  His doing
so would have created the first federal common law tort, or at least the first since Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins said there were none.1
        Perhaps because federalization would have worked so dramatic a change, Justice
Brennan settled on a calmer  way of solving the problem he faced.  He changed the roles
of judge and jury in libel cases, reducing the role of the jury by more than half. 
A procedural rule changing the allocation of power between judge and jury does
not change substantive law or even indicate the direction of change in substantive law.
Only its application to the facts of cases can do that.  That meant  we would have to wait
to see what changes in substance it brought, beyond the one it brought in New York Times
itself.  Given its origin, one could wonder whether the eventual change would be to
federalize the  issue of whether the words were defamatory.  
2What almost happened over the next twenty-seven years, until the canon closed in
1991 with the issue unresolved, is the principal subject here. The remains of that effort
evidences how a change in the collective cast of mind of serious people affected the
Court’s ability to decide issues incrementally, which is how the common law proceeds. 
 I.
We know of Justice Brennan’s first impulse because Anthony Lewis found the
first draft of the opinion in New York Times among his papers and published it in 1991 as
an appendix to his book, Make No Law.  The first section of that draft dealt with whether
“the Constitution is offended by a state’s law of libel….” decides that it can be, but  then
rejects simply wiping out the offending portion of the common law by granting an
absolute privilege to  “criticism of public officials reflecting on their official conduct….”
Anthony Lewis, Make No Law (Random House, 1991) App.1 at 1, hereafter, App.  1.  
The next section of that draft considered what the minimum constitutional
requirement for speech about government officials ought to be, and here Justice Brennan
turned to Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P.2d 281 (1908), a case protecting
statements about candidates for public office unless made with actual malice.  The draft
adopts that standard and then considers whether, under this new view of the law, the case
must be reversed, deciding that it must be.
            The draft opinion could have ended there.  It did not; instead, it went on to
consider what should happen on remand.  On that issue, the draft states a startling
notion:
The threshold question is whether the statements in the
advertisement complained of can reasonably be said to be capable of
a defamatory meaning.” Ibid.  at 20. 
                    It answered that question by saying that the Alabama Supreme Court had used a
definition of what is defamatory (tending to injure a person in reputation, etc.,) that the
common law had long endorsed, but which failed to distinguish between public officials
and private persons.  It was therefore not adequate here, and  
            …we proceed to our own judgment whether the statements
complained of by the respondent are capable of bearing a defamatory
meaning. Ibid.  at 21.
There followed a long discussion of the statements made in the advertisement
and the conclusion that they were not defamatory: 
3We hold that the statements complained of by the
respondent are not capable of bearing a defamatory
meaning either on their face or when read in the lights of
the proofs.  Ibid.  at 22.  
The draft demonstrates why the language was not defamatory, but never offers a
description of why the Court has the power to do what it is doing, and never generalizes
by suggesting what definition will replace the common law’s “words tending to injure” as
a way to gauging whether the language is damaging.  
After concluding that the advertisement was not defamatory, the draft turns to the
question of whether the advertisement was “of and concerning” Mr. Sullivan, holding,
without further specification of the theory for doing so, that there had not been clear,
convincing and unequivocal testimony that it was about him. Ibid. at 24. 
That draft never saw the light of day; it was printed but circulated, according to
Lewis, only to Brennan’s clerks, and the long section on the nonlibelous nature of the
advertisement nowhere appears in Justice Brennan’s eventual opinion for the Court.  One
surmises that, on second thought, or his clerks’ thought, Justice Brennan decided that
moving the central question of the law of defamation, the meaning of the words, into the
federal law would only make it more difficult to obtain the agreement of Justices Harlan,
White and Stewart and Clark.  
Only the “of the concerning”  point remained in the opinion.   It was expanded to
include a discussion of the illegitimacy of turning a statement about government into a
statement about an individual who worked for government, but shows no sign of  being a
exercise of an independent power of the Court to read the words to determine whether
they were “… capable of bearing a defamatory meaning either on their face or when read
in the lights of the proofs.”  But, of course, the notion is there; one cannot decide that the
words are not of and concerning the plaintiff without reading the words differently than
did the Alabama jury.  The issue is not quite the same as the issue of whether the words
are defamatory, but the way the issue was handled in the opinion leaves one with the
impression that deciding what the words mean may be within the Court’s power.
In the first draft, the discussion of the constitutionality of the common law
definition of libel occurred in connection  with the issue of what should happen on
remand.  That issue now had to be resolved on a different theory, and Justice Brennan did
so, in his opinion for the Court,  by applying the new actual malice standard in a way
which exercised  the new balance of power between judge and jury:
As to the Times, we similarly  conclude that the facts do not support a finding of
actual malice....the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that it was a ‘cavalier
4ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement’...does not indicate malice at the time of
the publication; even if the advertisement was not ‘substantially correct’...that
opinion was at least a reasonable one, and there was no evidence to impeach the
witness’ good faith in holding it.  376 U.S., at 286.
     ....
We think the evidence against the Times supports at most a finding of
negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and is constitutionally
insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice.
Id, at 288. 
Reaching that conclusion required the Court to disregard what the Alabama jury
had specifically found; the Court did so, without dissent on the issue, except to the extent
that dissent is implied by the abolitionist position of Justices Black, Douglas and
Goldberg.  The Court, rather than a jury, would find the facts as to the author’s state of
mind, because the Constitution made the Court the final finder of fact: 
We ‘examine for ourselves the statements in issue
and the circumstances under which they were made to
see...whether they are of a character which the principles of
the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect’  376 U.S. at 285. 
  Justice Brennan cited Pennekamp v. Florida, 338 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) for the rule
expanding the role of the judge, but it  derives from Fiske v.  Kansas 
, 274 U.  S.  380
(1927), the  IWW case in which the Court set aside Kansas’ criminal syndicalism statute on
the ground that it  violated  due process, and flowered in the Scottsboro cases, Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).  Fiske had made it First Amendment doctrine, but one did
not talk about First Amendment doctrine in l927.  Those words had not yet been invented.
5II.
New York Times purported only to decide a single issue, one never before put to the
Court, indeed, one not imaginable during the first 150 years of the Republic: The
constitutionality of the common law tort of defamation.  In the course of forever changing
that tort, it finally put to bed the notion of seditious libel; that was why it was, in
Alexander Meiklejohn’s wonderful phrase, “… an occasion for dancing in the streets.”
The central holding was to require, in cases involving libel on government, a
requirement of proof of a particular state of mind, called actual malice, but really meaning
speech that was known to be false.  There was, in the cases that followed,  a rounding out
of the scope of those to whom the new requirement would apply, since not all news is
news about people who hold public office.  The set of potential issues was reasonably
clear at the outset: after all, there are only so many classes of people between the class
called public officials and the class called nobody.  So the issue took only three cases to
reach its full dimension: The trio is Times in l964, Butts and Walker in 1967 and Gertz in
l974... The final form would include less than everyone but most of those who are actually
newsworthy; that was implied from the outset and became  reasonably clear when Butts
and Walker were decided three years after New York Times, adding public figures to the
class of persons who had reduced rights.  
The secondary issue, by way of contrast, sputtered and flamed for twenty some
years and comprises many cases.  The issue is what words and what acts are not sufficient
to prove that one knew that what was about to be published was probably false.  It is a
negative issue: one cannot describe all the ways any issue  cannot be proven.  That meant
that the form of decision was usually “this is not enough”, a form which does not give
much guidance to the next case.
The third issue was the issue raised by Justice Brennan’s first draft.  It is whether
some knowingly false speech would be protected on the ground that it was not, as a matter
of federal law, defamatory, even if the common law would have said it was defamatory.
That issue appeared only  occasionally and, as we shall see, tended to get intertwined with
the actual malice issue.  It is the principal subject here.
6There were three dissenters from the theory of New York Times .   Justices Douglas,
Black and Goldberg concurred in the result, but not the theory.   All three believed an
absolute privilege for “criticism of the way public officials do their duty”, 376 U.S. 295
(Black, J., concurring) was required.  Their intuition was that actual malice would be “hard
to prove and hard to disprove…” and ultimately, an  “ evanescent protection”; the Black
and Goldberg opinions show a distrust of juries in politically charged cases and an
unwillingness to involve the Court in overturning bad state law verdicts.  Abolishing  the
common law at least in cases about governmental acts and probably in all defamation
cases, was, in their view, more efficient than embarking on a  search for a new, partly
federal, partly state, tort.  If they were right, one would expect that the issue of the
adequacy of the actual malice standard, of whether some speech needed protection even
though it was spoken with knowledge of its probable falsity, would recur.
III.
And, of course, it did, six years later, in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
Company v. Bresler, 398 U. S. 6 (1970) and six more times over the next quarter century.
          Bresler, a real estate developer, had offered to give the city land for a school in
return for changing the zoning on the rest of his project.    An opponent of the zoning
change condemned that kind of quid pro quo as blackmail.   The newspaper which
reported her charge was sued for  defamation.  A  jury found that the newspaper had a
falsely accused Mr.  Bresler of a crime. Two appellate courts affirmed, the Supreme Court
reversed.
                The developer had offered the exchange openly; an offer made publicly could not
be blackmail,  a covert act.  The fact that the offer had been made openly was part of the
newspaper’s story; it was context which had to be taken into account and doing so  meant
that the speaker did not really mean blackmail, but only that the developer’s offer of to
give land to the city was blinding its judgment.  Since the facts did not support
interpreting the word blackmail as a charge of blackmail, the plaintiff’s use of the word
must have meant something else.   
          Justice Stewart’s opinion in Bresler says that the word blackmail was an epithet,
understood by a reasonable listener as exaggeration, and therefore as conveying something
other than a fact:  
    It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word
"blackmail" in either article would not have understood exactly
what was meant: it was Bresler's public and wholly legal
negotiating proposals that were being criticized. No reader could
2
.  John v.  Tribune Co., 24 Ill  2d 437, 181 N.E. 2d 105 (l962) states the Illinois position. 
Professor Harry Kalven Jr. mused aloud in his 1967 piece on the progress of New York Times as
to whether the Court would invert the rule of libel per quod, Harry Kalven Jr., The Reasonable
Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, l967 Supreme Court Review 267, 308fn.
126.
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have thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the
newspaper articles reporting their words were charging Bresler
with the commission of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even
the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no
more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those
who considered Bresler's negotiating position extremely
unreasonable. Indeed, the record is completely devoid of evidence
that anyone in the city of Greenbelt or anywhere else thought
Bresler had been charged with a crime. 398 U.S. at 14 
                         Except, of course, the jury, which had been charged on that issue.  Blackmail,
according to Justice Stewart, was the kind of word that implied that the speaker was
overstating his case.  The word, however, conveys no such exuberant quality .  If any
word other than murder conveys a charge of crime succinctly, blackmail does so.  Its
tendency to harm reputation seems unarguable and drawing that inference was, at
common law,  the business of a jury, not a judge.    Bresler gets around that cruel fact by
holding that one needs to look at the context, at the other words used at the time, to
decide whether the word was more than innocent  malapropism.  When one looks at the
other words, one is using context to modify, by making innocent, a word the common
law had said is not innocent. 
  This new law of constitutional defamation had a basis in the common law of one
state.  Illinois required that if there was an innocent construction of the words, they
should, as a matter of law, be read innocently.  No other state was so genuinely
unsolicitous of reputation.  The common law was quite the other way: words innocent
on their face could be made libelous by context, that was what libel per quod was all
about, but plainly libelous words, like “blackmail” could not be made innocent by their
surroundings.2  None of this common law background appears in Bresler, and it is
therefore not clear on the face of the opinion that  something other than the common
law is being used to decipher the words.   
                    The importance of what was going on did not escape Justice White.  His dissent
first notes that the case could have been, but was not, decided under the actual malice
standard:
8           Although the Court does not so hold, arguably the newspaper should
not be liable if it had no intention of charging a crime and had a
good faith, nonreckless belief that it was not doing so. 398 U.S., at
23.
He then describes, quite precisely, what the Count is doing:
Should New York Times v. Sullivan, U.S. 254 (1964), be extended
to preclude liability for injury to reputation caused by employing
words of double meaning, one of which is libelous, whenever the
publisher claims in good faith to have intended the innocent
meaning? I think not. The New York Times case was an effort to
effectuate the policies of the First Amendment by recognizing the
difficulties of ascertaining the truth of the allegations about a public
official whom the newspaper is investigating with an eye to
publication. Absent protection for the nonreckless publication of
"facts" that subsequently prove to be false, the danger is that
legitimate news and communication will be suppressed
.                 
But it is quite a different thing, not involving the same
danger of self-censorship, to immunize professional communicators
from liability for their use of ambiguous language and their failure to
guard against the possibility that words known to carry two meanings,
one of which imputes commission of a crime, might seriously damage
the object of their comment in the eyes of the average reader. I see no
reason why the members of a skilled calling should not be held to the
standard of their craft and assume the risk of being misunderstood - if
they are - by the ordinary reader of their publications. If it is thought
that the First Amendment requires more protection for the media in
this respect in accurately reporting events and statements occurring at
official meetings, it would be preferable directly to carve out a wider
privilege for such reporting.  Id.
Justice White was surely correct in suggesting that it was possible to make the result
in Bresler fit the knowing falsehood rubric.   Nonetheless, that formula is never mentioned
in the opinion for the Court and both the language of Bresler and of Justice White’s dissent
suggest that the case was exploring the issue Justice Brennan had put in his first draft but
opted not to pursue. 
9Bresler is an enigmatic opinion.  The Court does not describe the generalized form
of the theory it is applying; it does not say it was redefining the word “blackmail” as a
nonderogatory word.  It get the same result by saying that the use of the word had been
ambiguous, and then opting for the innocent version of the ambiguity. Since doing so was
contrary to the common law, the Court was replacing part of common law with federal
law.  It had already done that in New York Times by adding a requirement of proof of
malice; it was now doing the same thing by adding a rule that the context, at least the
context that appears in the publication, could negate the derogatory inference.  The Court
thus federalized  the central issue of the law of defamation, which is whether the words
are defamatory.  
      It does so by exercising the power of Justice Brennan’s rule changing the role of
judge and jury.  The jury, after all, had found actual malice in speaking and repeating the
word blackmail.  It did that by focusing on the way a reader would have understood the
words.  That was the common law way of gauging damaging words; its theory is an early
instance of deconstruction.  Shifting the burden of reading the words to the judge was a
way of changing the focus from what the reader understood to what the author must have
intended.  
        New York Times meant that the common law definition of what was libelous, ‘that
the words tended to injure reputation’ had to change; the minimum change was that a
jury find ‘ that the words were intended to injure reputation.’ But Bresler did not give
that charge to a jury or give controlling weight to what the speaker or the republisher
said they had intended, as New York Times had done.  Instead, using the  reserved
power of judges to find the facts in constitutional cases, it allocated the question to the
judges, and then used that power to reinterpret the word by giving controlling weight to
the factual context in which the word was used.  Had it sent the issue back for another
jury trial, it would have had to state what the jury should be told to do, and that would
have made it explicit that the common law rule that the reader’s understanding of the
words had been displaced and that the meaning of words was for judges, not juries, to
decide.  
The next time it faced this kind of issue, the Court did something even more
complicated.  In Time, Inc. v. Pape, the Court changed it focus from what the words, in
context, must have meant to what the author said they meant when he or she used them.
Again, however, it was the judge who was to decide what the author meant.  
10
Time had reported on an U.S. Civil Rights Commission report on police brutality.
The case had been fully tried, but a verdict for Time, Inc. was directed at the close of the
evidence.  There was thus no jury verdict for the plaintiff and no need or opportunity to
use the rule diminishing the role of the jury. Instead, the issue was whether the facts,
indulging every inference in favor of the plaintiff, stated a claim for defamation.
In referring to a section dealing with Chicago, the Commission had quoted the
allegations of a complaint against a Chicago police officer.  Time reported the charges
without noting that they were only allegations, making it look as if the Commission had
decided they were established facts.  The omission could, of course, have been negligent,
and there would have been no liability.  Time’s reporter, however, made the case more
difficult by testifying that he dropped the quotation marks the Commission had used
because he understood the report, read as a whole, to be an endorsement by the
Commission of the likely truth of the allegations.  Faced with that complication, Justice
Stewart thought the problem of reporting on book length public reports deserved special
consideration:    
A press report of what someone has said about an
underlying event of news value can contain an almost
infinite variety of shadings.  Where the source of the news
makes bald assertions of fact - such as that a police officer
has arrested a certain man on a criminal charge - there
may be no difficulty.  But where the source itself has
engaged in qualifying the information released,
complexities ramify.  Any departure from full direct
quotation of the words of the source, with all its
qualifying language, inevitably confronts the publisher
with a set of choices.  401 U.S., at 286
                       Those choices, Justice Stewart said, were protected by the First Amendment,
because liability for errors of interpretation was inconsistent the with knowing falsehood
requirement of    New York Times:  
           Applying this standard to Time’s interpretation of the
Commission report, it can hardly be said that Time acted
in reckless disregard of the truth.  Given the ambiguities
of the Commission Report as a whole, and the testimony
11
of the Time author and researcher, Time’s conduct
reflected at most an error of judgment.  Ibid.,  at 292
12
Bresler involved accurate quotation, an act innocent on its face, while Pape, in
dropping the quotation marks, involved an act a jury could construe as knowingly
wrongful. Pape is thus the more difficult case.  It is hard to characterize an accusation
that a police officer was brutal as an innocent statement, or as an exaggeration or as
anything else not defamatory.  Referring to the context did not soften or provide an
innocent meaning of the word.  It was, as a result, difficult to apply the theory used in
Bresler. On the face of the text, use of word brutal and the dropping of the quotation
marks are both intentional acts that result in a statement known to be false and
derogatory.   
    The Court finds dropping of the quotation marks innocent; it does so by crediting
the author’s statement about why he deleted the quotation marks, and then making that
statement conclusive, so that there was no need to have a jury decide whether the
author’s testimony as to his good faith was truthful.   Doing so is an ultimate example of
what it means to make the judge the final arbiter of facts affecting speech protected by
the First Amendment; the judge gets to determine the credibility of the witnesses.  The
result reads a whole lot like an absolute privilege to make false and defamatory
statements about some subjects, but a privilege granted only after the fact, on a case by
case basis.     
Having held in New York Times that intentional falsehood deserves no protection,
the Court now protects precisely that kind of speech.  After all, the witness said he
dropped the quotation marks because he decided the Commission really meant to make
a more serious charge that it actually made.   It is a close to an absolute privilege for
speech about public officers – as close to just wiping out the tort of defamation - as the
Court will come.  Perhaps only the judge who said “I can’t define pornography, but I
know it when I see it” could have accomplished this result without acknowledging what
he had done. 
The next three cases are easier.  They are  Letter Carriers v. Austin, Bose v.
Consumers Union of the U.S. and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.  Letter Carriers says
“scab” is an epithet, and thus not capable of defamatory meaning, a conclusion easier to
reach but surely supported by Bresler. Bose involved the accuracy of CU’s testing of
high fidelity speakers, and was really a test of the limits of public issue speech, except
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that the parties forgot to raise that issue.  Falwell, decided in 1988, is important for
several reasons.  First, it is Justice Rehnquist’s first opinion in the area.  Secondly, it is a
reaffirmation, but by a now quite different court, of the actual malice rule.  And, lastly,
it  changed the role of the judge.  
  Bose v. Consumer’s Union involved a jury verdict for having said that Bose’s
speakers that seemed to make the instruments wander around the room.  The effect
apparently could not be produced for the jury, though CU’s tester, a professional
listener, was quite clear about what he heard: 
“Worse, individual instruments heard through the Bose system seemed
to grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander about the room.
For instance, a violin appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched
from wall to wall.  With orchestral music, such effects seemed
inconsequential.  But we think they might become annoying when
listening to soloists.”  466 U.S. 485, at 488 
The issue, for Justice Stevens, was whether the description could have been
written with actual malice.  The issue was entwined with a new argument about scope of
review, based on Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules, which gives Seventh Amendment-like
sanctity to trial court findings of fact.  Justice Stevens, while giving no ground on the
scope of judicial review in First Amendment cases, found the two contradictory rules
quite compatible, emphasizing the role judges had played even at common law with
respect to whether actual malice had been proven by clear and convincing evidence:
First, the common-law heritage of the rule itself assigns
an especially broad role to the judge in applying it to
specific factual situations. Second, the content of the rule
is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is
given meaning through the evolutionary process of
common-law adjudication; though the source of the rule
is found in the Constitution, it is nevertheless largely a
judge-made rule of law. Finally, the constitutional values
protected by the rule make it imperative that judges - and
in some cases judges of this Court - make sure that it is
14
correctly applied. A few words about each of these
aspects of the rule are appropriate.  Ibid. at 501.
                ....
     The requirement of independent appellate review
reiterated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of
federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency
of deciding concrete cases; it is law in its purest form
under our common-law heritage. It reflects a deeply held
conviction that judges - and particularly Members of this
Court - must exercise such review in order to preserve
the precious liberties established and ordained by the
Constitution.  Ibid. at 510-511.
      Having established judicial primacy, Justice Stevens had no difficulty in finding that
actual malice had not been proven:
      Seligson [CU’s tester] of course had insisted “I know what I
heard.”  The trial court took him at his word, and reasoned that
since he did know what he had heard, and he knew that the
meaning of the language employed did not accurately reflect
what he heard, he must have realized the statement was
inaccurate at the time he wrote it.  “Analysis of this kind may be
adequate when the alleged libel purports to be an eyewitness or
other direct account of events that speak for themselves.”  Time,
Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S., at 285.  See generally, The Santissima
Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 338-339 (1822). Here, however,
adoption of the language chosen was “one of a number of
possible rational interpretations” of an event “that bristled with
ambiguities” and descriptive challenges for the writer.  Time,
Inc. v. Pape, supra, at 290. The choice of such language, though
reflecting a misconception, does not place the speech beyond
the outer limits of the First Amendment’s broad protective
umbrella.  Ibid. at 512
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The opinion cites Pape and is Pape, only this time applied to what a reporter hears, rather
than what he or she reads.  What looks, objectively, like knowing falsehood, is set aside,
this time after a jury had found liability, because the author’s testimony as to what he
heard is constitutionally insurmountable.  Once again, the interior mental process is given
greater protection than is implied by a rule that does not protect intentionally false
speech.  That result is accomplished by giving great weight to the author’s testimony as
to his state of mind; indeed, unless he or she has written a memo saying that I gave false
testimony, it appears to be binding.  Since the author probably had perfect pitch, and
therefore heard things the rest of us can’t, or can’t any longer, that is not a surprising or
unfair result, although one can see why a manufacturer whose customers do not have
perfect pitch would object to the dissemination of such special knowledge. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented:
Presumably any doctrine of "independent review" of facts exists, not so that an
appellate court may inexorably place its thumb on the scales in favor of the
party claiming the constitutional right, but so that perceived shortcomings of
the trier of fact by way of bias or some other factor may be compensated for.
But to me, the only shortcoming here is an appellate court's inability to make
the determination which the Court mandates today - the de novo determination
about the state of mind of a particular author at a particular time. Although
there well may be cases where the "actual malice" determination can be made
on the basis of objectively reviewable facts in the record, it seems to me that
just as often it is made, as here, on the basis of an evaluation of the credibility
of the testimony of the author of the defamatory statement. I am at a loss to see
how appellate courts can even begin to make such determinations. In any event,
surely such determinations are best left to the trial judge.  466U.S. 485, 519-
520.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (l988) involves Hustler’s parody of a
popular advertisement; Campari bitters had run a series of ads about the first sexual
encounters of celebrities.  Hustler’s version suggests that the well-known plaintiff, a
conservative Christian minister, had his first sexual experience in an outhouse and it
involved his mother.  A jury found for the defendant on a libel claim, but for the plaintiff
on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Court reverses the verdict
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for emotional distress, saying that New York Times applies and that the jury’s verdict on
the defamation issue means there can be no liability for emotional harm:
Respondent would have us find that a State’s interest in protecting
public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First
Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is
intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not
reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the
public figure involved.  This we decline to do.
               485 U.S., at 50.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, apparently not content to simply rely on the jury’s finding
of no liability of the libel count, examines the advertisement and concluded that it “could
not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts.” The criterion is the same as
that which Justice Brennan used in his first draft, “...whether the statements in the
advertisement complained of can reasonably said to be capable of a defamatory
meaning,” App.  1 at 20;  Justice Rehnquist is not changing the scope of the Court’s
power of review, but he is changing the focus of that review.  
          One could have said that a cartoon is, in its nature, an exaggeration, akin to an
epithet, and on that ground not defamatory, as in Bresler. That is not what the Court said.
Instead, it went to the knowing falsehood test, but this time to the falsehood portion of the
phrase.  Falsehood means, it said,  facts, and an exaggeration – that is what a parody is –
is not a fact or even something extrapolated from a fact. 
           The problem is that an exaggeration must be an exaggeration of something, and it
is simply not possible to figure out the unexaggerated state which the cartoon was
invoking.  But if the cartoon was not a parody, not an exaggeration, it must have been
asserting a fact.  It is,  moreover, a fact which the author does not even claim to be true.
The holding in Falwell, fairly read, is thus that some speech is protected even if probably
false.  The odd part is that the Chief Justice didn’t need to do that.  The issue was
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whether emotional distress was covered by New York Times.  The Court could have said
‘yes’ to that, relied on the state verdict of not guilty as to the libel claim and ended the
case.  Some clue to why it did not comes from Justice Rehnquist’s language rejecting
recovery for emotional distress.  It is a clue that will influence his stance in all of the
remaining cases in this set:
If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate
the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little
or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are
quite sure that the pejorative description “outrageous" does not supply
one. "Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has
an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to
impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps
on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An
"outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal
to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may
have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.  385 U.S. at 55. 
          The petition for certiorari in Falwell had asserted error in the Court of Appeals
rejection of a defense based on the fact-opinion distinction.  That theory is never
mentioned in the opinion.  One might speculate that the Chief  Justice assigned the opinion
to himself so that it could be written without ever referring to that issue and, instead, say
something useful about subjective jurors, and, by implication, subjective judges.  Because
a majority of the Court voted reverse, writing the opinion might thus present an
opportunity to build some benefits for the future into a result he could not change.  Indeed,
his dissent in Bose is consistent with the view that he was picking his spots carefully; he
had there said, in l984, 466 U.S. 485, 520n2 :
The fact-finding process engaged in by a jury rendering a
general verdict is   much less evident to the naked eye and thus more
suspect than the fact-finding process engaged in by a trial judge who
makes written findings as here. Justifying independent review of facts
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found by a jury is easier because of the absence of a distinct "yes" or
"no" in a general jury verdict as to a particular factual inquiry and
because of the extremely narrow latitude allowed appellate courts to
review facts found by a jury at common law. Thus it is not surprising to
me that early cases espousing the notion of independent appellate review
of "constitutional facts," such as Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)
and New York Times, should have arisen out of the context of jury
verdicts and that they then were perhaps only reflexively applied in other
quite different contexts without further analysis. See Time, Inc. v.
Pape....
                 IV.
          Whatever Justice Rehnquist’s reasons for writing Falwell,  he had, six years earlier,
begun to claim that New York Times had gone too far.  His views are stated in a dissent from
the denial of certiorari in Lawrence v. Bauer Pub. & Printing, Ltd., 459 U.S. 999 (1982).  In
voting to review the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling that a jury verdict for two public
figures had to be set aside because an independent review of the record did not support a
finding of actual malice, then Justice Rehnquist said:
It sees to me inescapable that the New Jersey Supreme Court in
this case felt bound by some invisible radiations from New York
Times v. Sullivan, supra, to reweigh for itself the credibility of
interested witnesses who might have been wholly disbelieved by
a jury.  The above quotation from the opinion of the New Jersey
court indicates that it felt required to credit the testimony of the
defendant’s witnesses, all of whom were interested in the
outcome of the lawsuit.
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Justice Rehnquist’s statement suggests why there was a fight over the effect
of  Rule 52 (a) in Bose.  His dislike of emanations presaged a successful effort, in the
last two cases of this canon, to reapportion New York Times so as to assert the rights
of state juries and state law, and the change comes  precisely because both state
institutions deal with the issue of whether juries or judges should resolve the
credibility of testimony by the defendant.  Justice Brennan’s reallocation of  power
between judges and juries was finally under siege.
Those last two cases are Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)
and Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).  It is useful,
however, to backtrack again, for the result in those cases was forecast by another of
Justice Rehnquist’s dissents from a denial of certiorari.
That dissent was from the denial of certiorari in Ollman v. Evans and Novak.
Understanding what  the dissent was objecting to requires some background about
that case,  a six to five decision by the D.C. Circuit en banc which generated seven
opinions, three of them on the winning side. Isolating its precise holding is something
of an adventure. 
At issue in Ollman was whether Professor Ollman, a candidate to become the
Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Maryland, had been
defamed by an Evans and Novak column which quoted an unnamed academic as
stating the Ollman had “no status within the profession…” Ollman,  then a Marxist
and a professor at NYU, claimed that he could provide plentiful evidence of his
standing in the profession.
The defense in Ollman was that the offending statement was not defamatory
because it was a statement of opinion, rather than of fact, constitutionally protected
because opinions are at the core of First Amendment protection.  The argument
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stemmed from a dictum in the Gertz case, and had been gaining momentum among
the libel defense bar since l974. 
Judge Starr, writing for five of the majority, but only three as to his last part, bought
that argument:
In Gertz, the Supreme Court in dicta seemed to provide absolute
immunity from defamation for all opinions and to discern the basis
for this immunity in the First Amendment.  Under the First
Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea.  “However
pernicious an opinion may be....”  By this statement, Gertz elevated to
constitutional principle the distinction between fact and opinion,
which at common law had formed the basis of the doctrine of fair
comment.  750 F.2d 970, at 975
To Judge Starr, the assertion of a lack of status was essentially “meaningless and
could not be libelous.” 
Judge Bork’s opinion, for himself and Judges Ginsburg, Wilkey and MacKinnon,
took quite a different tack.  First, it rejected the fact-opinion distinction as arid and
formalistic:
Some lower courts have assumed, as do some members of this
court, not only that this opinion v. fact formula is controlling, but
that it is governed, at least primarily, by grammatical analysis.  I
think that incorrect.  Any such rigid doctrinal framework is
inadequate to resolve the sometimes contradictory claims of the
libel laws and the freedom of the press.
....
If common usage were the test, and if we looked at the sentence
standing alone, the dissent’s characterization would certainly be
correct.  The challenged language is a statement that others hold
a particular opinion.  Whether or not they do is a question of
fact, though, as I will try to show, it is a “fact” of a peculiar
nature in the context of first amendment litigation. If placing the
bare assertion in question into one of two compartments labeled
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“opinion and “fact” were the only issue we were allo wed to
consider, I would join the dissent.  750 F.2d, at 994
The core of Judge Bork’s opinion is a description of what a trial of the issue of
“status in the profession” would look and sound like. Given the number of subsets within
political science, and the continuing debate among historians, political scientists,
sociologists and anthropologists as to the dividing lines among their specialties, it would
take a very wise judge to decide who was qualified to vote or testify on Ollman’s status
in “the profession.”  The result is likely to be a trial of what political science is, rather
than rather than a trial of Ollman’s status among those who consider themselves to be
political scientists. 
That analysis of the practical effect of allowing the suit to go forward is the basic
premise of Judge Bork’s view of the nature of judging.  His  statement of why judges
must consider the practical effect of what they do is so eloquent that he repeated it in his
biography:
Judge Scalia’s dissent implies that the idea of evolving
constitutional doctrine should be anathema to judges who adhere to
a philosophy of judicial restraint.  But most doctrine is merely the
judge-made superstructure that implements basic constitutional
principles.  There is not at issue here the question of creating new
constitutional rights or principles, a question which would divide
members of this court along other lines than that of the division in
this case.  When there is a known principle to be explicated the
evolution of doctrine is inevitable.  Judges given stewardship of a
constitutional provision –such as the first amendment–whose core
is known but whose outer reach and contours are ill-defined, face
the never ending task of discerning the meaning of the provisions
from one case to the next.  There would be little need for
judges–and certainly no office for a philosophy of judging-- if the
boundaries of every constitutional provision were self-evident.
They are not.  In a case like this, it is the task of the judge in this
generation to discern how the framers’ values, defined in the
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context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know.  750
F.2d, at 995.
That statement, and the process by which it is applied to the facts of the case, is
pragmatism at its best.  None of the “facts” about the nature of political science or the
process of evaluating academic stature were part of the record; this was a case that had
never been tried.  Denied a record, Judge Bork drew on his own knowledge of the
academic world.  It is probably quite an accurate picture;  like all pragmatic judging, it
requires judges who know more about the world around them than most judges know. 
For present purposes, however, it is only important to note where Judge Bork
looked for precedent:
For this reason, it is instructive to compare the Court’s
treatment of an even more clearly “factual” assertion in
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Company Association v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
Applying Bresler led Judge Bork to conclude:
             Professor Ollman, as will be shown, placed himself in the
political arena and became the subject of heated political
debate.
.…
          My second point is less conventional, though by no means ruled
out by case law as a next step in the evolution of doctrine in
this troubling field.  It is this: in order to protect a vigorous
marketplace in political ideas and contentions, we ought to
accept the proposition that those who place themselves in a
political arena must accept a degree of derogation that others
need not.  750 F.2d, at 1002.
            So there you have it, Judge Bork was doing exactly what Justice Brennan had
done in his first draft of the opinion in New York Times; he federalized the central tenet of
the common law of defamation, the definition of which words are sufficiently derogatory
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of the plaintiff to be defamatory.. Though done in a pragmatic way, with no statement of
what was being done other than to apply Bresler so as to characterize “has no status” as
rhetorical hyperbole, Judge Bork, without any limiting theory other than that the
statement occur in the public arena, replaced the common law of what was defamatory
with federal law. 
Judge Scalia dissented:
It is this risk of judicial subjectivity...which troubles me.  Beyond that,
I may add, I distrust the more general risk of judicial subjectivity
presented by the concurrence’s creative approach to first amendment
jurisprudence.  It is an approach which embraces “a continuing
evolution of doctrine...not merely as a consequence of thoughtful
perception that old cases were decided wrongly at the time they were
rendered (see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education ...)...but rather in
reaction to judicially perceived “modern problems,”....
....
...it is frightening to think that the existence or nonexistence of a
constitutional rule ...is to depend on our ongoing personal assessments
of such sociological factors.  Ibid, Pp. 1038-1039. 
       Justice Rehnquist’s opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari suggests the
depth of his dislike for what the Court of Appeals had done:
I think the result reached by the Court of Appeals in this
case is nothing less than extraordinary. At the heart of the common
law of defamation were a few areas of expression which even
when spoken rather than written were regarded as so damaging as
to be classified as “slander per se” and therefore not to require the
proof of any special damages in order to allow recovery.  One of
these categories consists of statements which defame the plaintiff
in connection with his business or occupation….
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…to quote an unnamed political scientist as saying that
petitioner has “no status within the profession” is far more than
the mere statements of opinion traditionally protected by
qualified privilege under the common law of libel. Doctors who
are disapproved of by other doctors may find solace in the fees
paid by their patients….but the academic who is disapproved of
by his peers has no such healthy recourse outside the profession.
There, if ever, the opinion of one’s peers is virtually the sole
component of one’s professional reputation. 471 U.S. at p. 1127-
1129 (1985).
                     Because Judge Starr adopted, and Judge Bork rejected, the fact-opinion distinction
and because it will be the issue in the next case, it may be useful here to consider what
was at stake in the effort to import that common law theory into the First Amendment.
It was not an effort to override the common law; it was, instead, at least on its face, an
effort to elevate a portion of already existing common law to constitutional stature.
From a theoretical point of view, that is a pretty silly thing to do.  
                        If the fact-opinion distinction exists as part of the common law, there was no need
for the defendants in Ollman to make a constitutional argument; they could simply defend
on local law grounds, with the same result.  Perhaps they did not do so because local law
(the District of Columbia’s local law) was unclear, or perhaps they, or their lawyer, were
simply blinded by the opportunity to argue a First Amendment defense when ancient law
would have done the job.
            Indeed, isn’t it likely that it was the question of  how such a privilege could be
lost, that prompted the defendants in Ollman to make the argument that the distinction
was required by the constitution, and to base the argument on the broad language of
Gertz about the sanctity of opinions?  Assume for a moment that the common law
privilege of fair comment, which included the fact-opinion distinction, was, as Justice
Brennan said in New York Times, a privilege defeasible by a showing of actual malice.
Then consider what might occur if Ollman had been tried.  One of the likely first
questions to Evans or Novak would have been, “Who was your source?”  The answer
would have been, “I can’t tell you that; the source was promised confidentiality.”  There
would have ensued a by-play about reporter’s privilege, and however the question of jail
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time was resolved, the trial judge would have instructed the jury, as a growing custom
required, that it should assume that there was no source.
         If the source were invented, however, and the defense defeasible if published with
knowledge of its probable falsity, the plaintiff is entitled to a finding of knowing falsehood
from both the jury and the judge.  By way of contrast, the argument the defendants actually
made was that the words were opinion and therefore not defamatory.  That defense asserts
there is no actual malice issue, no need for discovery, and the existence of a source is
irrelevant. 
Ollman was thus not an effort to elevate another piece of the common law to
constitutional status.  It was, instead, an effort to add an absolute privilege for words
called opinions, just as the Court had, perhaps, already done for the quotation marks
omitted in Pape, the sounds heard in Bose and was later to do for the cartoon in Falwell.
VI. 
It took five more years for the now Chief Justice to get his full-fledged bite at the
issue.  The case was Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company, 497 U.S. 1 (l990).  A high
school wrestling team had gotten into a fight with the opposing team, and was suspended
for fighting.  The coach and the school sued and got the suspension lifted.  The local
paper thought they should have accepted their punishment.  It said, “is this the kind of
lesson we want our young people learning from the administrators and coaches.”  Worse,
it said, they got the reversal by fudging the truth about what happened, “Anyone who
attended the meet…knows in his heart that Milkovich…lied at the hearing….”
Chief Justice Rehnquist started his analysis with a history of the cases since
New York Times, correctly parsing them, and, in the process suggesting that no harm to
the main body of the doctrine was in issue.  He then cites the sentence fragment from
Gertz which started the whole opinion speculation, “Under the First Amendment, there
is no such thing as a false idea.  However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of
other ideas. “ 418 U.S., at 339-340.  He suggests that this language could hardly have
been intended to federalize the fact-opinion doctrine.  
He went on to suggest that only statements of the kind that might be modified
by further discussion could qualify as opinions.   Finally, he said that the Restatement
of Torts 2d, Section 566, comment a, had acknowledged that an expression of
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opinion could be defamatory, and had protected it only to the extent of requiring
proof of falsity and, if the opinion was about a matter of public interest, proof that it
was published solely for the purpose of doing harm, a restrictive form of the actual
malice requirement.  497 U.S., at 14.
Instead off using a concept like fact or opinion, the Chief Justice focused on
the portion of the actual malice rule which requires proof of falsity: if the words are
not capable of being proven false, the speaker cannot have said something he or she
knew was  false.   That is, of course, fact - opinion under another guise.  What it is
not is judges deciding what ambiguous words mean.  Since no jury had decided the
issue the Chief Justice had just created, the case could not be ended.  It was sent back
for trial to determine whether the coach had been accurate when he testified at the
Athletic Commission hearing.  The wrestling match had occurred in l974.  It was
now 1990. 
Justice Brennan dissented,  joined only by Justice Marshall.  The opinion is a
backfire, adopting the majority’s statement of the law and disputing only its
application to the facts. The real dispute is thus over the role of the judge, with
Rehnquist letting the jury have the first shot when the issue can be stated as the
credibility of the author’s statements, especially about why he used the words he
used, while Brennan is  willing to let the context of the article render its harshest
words innocent.
According to Justice Brennan, the majority had imposed on the plaintiff a duty
quite favorable to defendants, a duty to prove false not only what the words literally
say, but also any meaning a “reasonable reader would have understood the author to
have conveyed,” a really delightful perversion of what Justice Rehnquist said.  For
Justice Brennan, the reporter’s assertion that the coach was lying had been a
conjecture, based on what the reporter saw at the game and wrote after hearing the
coach’s testimony.  With that beginning, Justice Brennan had no difficulty in deciding
that a court could only conclude that the reporter had faithfully reported what he
believed he saw at the wrestling match.
Neither he nor the Chief Justice supported adoption of the fact – opinion
distinction into First Amendment law.  Justice Brennan came closest to doing so
when he said, “Statements of belief or opinion are like hyperbole, as the majority
agrees, in that they are not understood as actual assertions of fact...” but the end of
that sentence contains a significant limitation, “...but they may be actionable if they
3.  Private correspondence, Professor Daniel D. Merrill, Professor of Philosophy ,
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imply the existence of false and defamatory facts.” 497 U.S., at 27.  In the case of a
newspaper’s repetition of words spoken at a public meeting or events occurring at
such a meeting, Justice Brennan thought, “...the only fact implied by the second
statement is that the speaker drew this inference.  If the inference is sincere or
nondefamatory the speaker is not liable for damages.” Id.  His reading of the story led
him to the conclusion that the reporter was only stating a ‘conjecture’ when he
suggested that the coach was lying about the melee, and a conjecture, while somehow
different from an opinion, can be read innocently “Read in context, the statements
cannot reasonable be interpreted as implying such an assertion as fact.” 497 U.S., at
28.    His  careful  reading of the story was that the reporter had reported what he
thought he saw, and, having seen a melee, he was free to conclude that the coach was
not telling the truth, even if the coach honestly said that he didn’t see a melee.  
          Justice Brennan did, for the first time, string together some of the line of cases
that began with Bresler:
“As the majority recognizes, the kind of language used and the
context in which it is used may signal readers that an author is
not purporting to state or imply actual, known facts.  In such
cases, this Court has rejected claims to the contrary and found
that liability may not attach, ‘as a matter of constitutional law.
Ante at 17.  See, e.g. Bresler, supra (metaphor); Letter Carriers,
supra (hyperbole); Falwell, supra, (parody)” 497 U.S. at 27. 
          Justice Brennan could persuade only Justice Marshall to join him.  That meant
that at least seven Justices, and probably all nine, had rejected the fact-opinion
distinction.  And that was probably a good thing; one of the things Ollman and
Milkovich illustrate is that the distinction is very difficult to apply. Judge Bork’s
opinion in Ollman suggests it is too formal to be useful in resolving the variety of
factual situations presented by defamation cases. But the problem  also stems from the
fact that its form does not fit what the English language does.  A philosopher would say
that “opinion” is an epistemological category, while “fact” is a semantic or
metaphysical category.3 What is described by the two words can overlap without
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violating any rule of logic..   Analyzing the meaning of a narrative sentence is not easy
work; trying to do it with an instrument blunted by bad logic can be fool’s work. 
            The Restatement (Second) of Torts,  Sec. 566 (1977) tried valiantly to deal with
the overlap of the concepts embodied by the words ‘fact and opinion’ by saying that
there were two kinds of opinions, pure and mixed, and that mixed opinions were,
sometimes, really a form of fact rather than opinion, because they imply facts.   The
Comments to Sec. 566 are a lawyers’ effort to translate precise ideas taken from the
philosophy of language into words they could understand and  use.  But conceptual
analysis is a sophisticated form of philosophical inquiry, and the effort to dumb it down
for lawyers results in muddled terms, and in the kind of statements one makes when
one’s head is tired of thinking hard, see Judge Starr’s opinion in Ollman, 750 F.2d, at p.
980, esp. fn.18 and 20. 
                               Judge Bork called the fact-opinion distinction ‘flat and barren.’   Flat and barren
though it may be, a  judge who  understands and is sympathetic to the argument between
Kant and Hume can use the distinction an empiricist would make, a distinction  between
knowledge and belief,  to decide a defamation case.  It is a distinction that tends to favor
defendants, since philosophers define knowledge more carefully than do lawyers.  But
dealing with the Kantian notion of synthetic a priori knowledge (which the Restatement
translated as opinions that implied facts, an uneasy facsimile) is no easy matter.
Whether Judge Bork’s mode of analysis requires less of judges than does the
Restatement (Second) is, as an empiricist might say, a question we cannot yet answer,
but at least the words he used are straightforward and comprehensible by lay people.
                                   Justice Brennan’s dissent cites Professor Alfred Hill’s 1976 effort,  in the
course of taking the archaic out of the law of defamation, to straighten out the confusion
about fair comment.  Professor Hill had suggested that the fact – opinion distinction is a
variation on a more meaningful distinction between fact and value.  Hill, Defamation
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and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 Columbia L. Rev. 1205 (1976).  That is not
the same as Justice Brennan’s ‘conjecture’, and does not answer Judge Bork’s criticism
of the use of formal categories as the principle mode of analysis, but is does convey a
better sense of what is going on in the fact-opinion cases.  It was available as a basis for
compromise in Milkovich, but compromise was no longer in the air; the Chief Justice
had seven votes to reverse and used them to change the relative roles of judge and jury
in First Amendment case.
             Chief Justice Rehnquist’s win in Milkovich, and its rejection of adding ‘conjecture’ as yet
another exception to the notion that New York Times involved only a rule requiring
malice,  could have ended the canon.  But one more really interesting case came
along, and the Court used it to say forcefully that Bresler, Pape and their progeny
should have no descendants. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., got to the Court
in l991, only a year after Milkovich.  Justice Brennan had, in that year, retired.             
                The Ninth Circuit had decided  that the quotation, “I was like an intellectual gigolo -
you get your pleasure from him, but you don’t take him out in public....” was not
actionable.  Masson claimed he had never said that.  During discovery, the author,
Janet Malcolm, had testified that even if the literal words were not on the tapes of
her interviews of Masson, he had said something very close to that.  At most, she
argued, she had changed the location of clauses so as to translate the syntax of the
oral interview into the style she would use if she were writing instead of talking.
Because a reporter often asks a question and the interviewee says ‘yes,’ the custom
is to rephrase the answer to incorporate the substance of the question. In the nature
of things, one sometimes edits the question; if the interview is not on tape and one
only has notes, the notes are likely not to show either the precise question or
answer, but rather a resolution of the ambiguity inherent in each.    
              The District Court granted summary judgment to both defendants.  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the phrase “intellectual gigolo” was a rational interpretation
of conversations that bristled with ambiguities, and  protected by Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union.  It had also, writing just before Milkovich was decided, held the
phrase not defamatory because it was the expression of an opinion.  For good
measure, it had added that whatever harm the phrase might have caused was less
than that caused by admittedly accurate quotations from Masson, and thus not
actionable under the “incremental harm branch of the ‘libel-proof’ doctrine.” 
           So the case came to the Court bristling with theories that enthusiastic defense
counsel had decided should be litigated in the highest court in the land.  The reason
for using all those theories of defense was, of course, the quotation marks Malcolm
had used. The words they surrounded  were not on her interview tapes.   
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              Justice Kennedy begins his discussion of the law by citing Greenbelt and
Milkovich, but sideways. Greenbelt, a case we have cited as Bresler because that is
the way Justice Brennan cited it, is cited for its holding that jury instructions must
describe accurately the kind of malice required by federal law,  Milkovich for its
lengthy but cramped summary of the federal law of defamation.  One surmises that
the mode of citation is not accidental.  Justice Kennedy used to teach Constitutional
Law, and it is legitimate to read his citations as a way of saying those two cases are
not what this case is going to be about.
                What it was about was whether state or federal law was to govern the case.  The
dissenters, Justices White and Scalia, made the point clearly: putting quotation
marks around words allegedly never said is a false statement knowingly made, and
thus proof of both falsity and of actual malice.  As they understood New York
Times, the author’s statement of her good intentions was not binding on the court: it
followed that the quotation marks, plus Masson’s statement that he had not uttered
the quoted words, were sufficient to prove knowing falsehood. The dissent thus
raises directly the question of whether some knowingly false speech is to be
protected.
                Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority chooses, however, not to discuss
whether the words might be protected even if there was actual malice.  Instead, he
held that the words might not be defamatory, but that was because the issue should
have been decided under California, not federal, law.  Local law governed the issue,
relieving the Court of any role.  
            The issue on which his opinion focused was one the Court of Appeals had relied on,
apparently as a matter of federal law.  It said that the false words must hurt (the
plaintiff’s reputation) more than the other, uncontested, things said about the plaintiff
in the writing.  The doctrine is sort of the opposite of exaggeration; if one says
something inaccurate and defamatory, but less defamatory that one could have
truthfully said, there is no liability.
             Justice Kennedy drew this rule from the textbook used in the most popular California bar
review course and from (now Judge) Robert Sack’s, Libel, Slander and Related
Problems (1980), the best textbook ever written about the law of defamation.  The
new rule said that use of quotation marks was not enough to show knowing or
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probable falsehood “unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning
conveyed by the statement.”  Use of the quotation marks was relevant but not
dispositive; it could be balanced by the self-defamatory character of other things
Masson had said. 
            But it was not a federal rule: 
Here, we reject any suggestion that the incremental harm doctrine is
compelled as a matter of First Amendment protection for speech.  The
question of incremental harm does not bear on whether the defendant has
published a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”  501 U.S. 496, 523, 
and that single issue, according to Justice Kennedy, was the sum of  First
Amendment law regarding defamation. As a result, the case needed to go back for
trial, so that a district court sitting in California could decide whether California
really had such a doctrine, and a jury could decide whether it fit the facts.   
        Justice Kennedy did discuss a defense argument, based on Bose v. Consumers
Union, Inc. and Time, Inc. v. Pape, that an author need only make a rational
interpretation of a complex set of facts, and that Ms. Malcolm’s article was a rational,
even if inaccurate, reading. Unlike the summary treatment that claim got in
Milkovich, Justice Kennedy discussed the cases.  He characterized Bose and Pape as
protecting any rational interpretation of ambiguous facts.  He then declined to put
quotation marks in that category.  They could not be regarded as an act of rational
interpretation, because they were used “to inform us that we are reading the statement
of petitioner, not Malcolm’s rational interpretation.” 501 U.S. 496, 519. His holding
is that deliberate alteration by adding quotation marks is not enough to prove a
violation of the knowing falsehood standard, but that a jury should hear the tapes of
the interviews and decide whether the words plus the quotation marks plus any other
evidence showed a knowingly false emendation of the tapes.  Game, set and match to
the Chief Justice.
      Pape involved removing quotation marks, Masson added them.  Of course, the
reporter in Pape was working from a government report, while the reporter in
Masson was working from her own notes.  But the governmental nature of the
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underlying document is not the crux of the decision; it was the omission of the
quotation marks, making the article read as if it was the Civil Rights Commission’s
own conclusion, rather than that of the reporter, that Officer Pape complained about.
And while Justice Kennedy’s point about quotation marks signing that no mental
processing has taken place is correct, the use or nonuse of quotation marks is not an
accurate description of the mental process that is relevant under New York Times:
Malcolm’s affidavit says she went through a mental process, and since the article was
written from notes and tapes of interviews, that testimony has to be true.  
Masson implies that quotation marks trump words (like blackmail).  The issue
is about the power of symbols; both the quotation mark and the words are elements in
a debate about what is sufficiently derogatory to cause liability.  And, despite his
words to the contrary, Justice Kennedy disposed of the issue by applying federal
constitutional law.
              After all, a holding that as a matter of Constitutional law the use of these
symbols distinguishes this case from the quotation marks omitted in Pape is a federal
holding.  It follows, although the point is pretty abstract, that Justice Kennedy’s
conclusion about the effect of adding quotation marks is a holding that federal
constitutional law governs at least some elements of deciding what is defamatory. 
            Perhaps Justice Kennedy knew that such a discussion was not where he wanted to
go; he certainly did not go there.  It seems fair to conclude that the Court was not
interested in exploring whether this language was entitled to an absolute privilege under
the First Amendment.  Instead, it was interested in sending that whole set of issues back
to the states, to see if they could deal with them as common law matters, and thus spare
the Court from having to hear any more defamation cases.  
         Nonetheless,  Justice Kennedy chose to distinguish rather than overrule.  The earlier
cases, he said, had distinguished between a rational interpretation of an ambiguous source
and the ‘direct account of events that speak for themselves,” a quote taken from Pape
itself.  501 U.S., at 520. “The protection for rational interpretation serves First
Amendment principles by allowing an author the interpretive license that is necessary
when relying on ambiguous sources.” Id.  By distinguishing, rather than repudiating the
earlier cases, the form of the opinion suggests that the Court has not overruled Bresler,
Pape, Bose and Falwell.  Whatever those cases stand for, they continue to stand.
         Before turning to what they may yet mean, one can pause briefly on the Rehnquist
and Kennedy contributions to  old fashioned common law defamation.  The members of
the libel defense bar talk to each other and ideas spread as opportunity arises.  Justice
Kennedy’s suggestion that substantial truth might, in many states, get you a summary
judgment has spread to states that had never heard of it.  The same can be said for Chief
4
.  The result is a tolerance for ambiguity unknown to the common law.  See, e.g., Schivarelli v.
CBS, Inc., 333 Ill. app. 3d 755, 776 N.E. 2d 693, 30 Media L. Rep. 2268 (1st Dist. 2002):
Similarly, here, Ms. Zekman's statement to Mr. Schivarelli, "Let's sum this up for a
second, the evidence seems to indicate that you're cheating the city," was not made in
any specific factual context. Ms. Zekman did not explain the evidence that she was
referring to, nor did she state why she thought Mr. Schivarelli was cheating the city,
how he was cheating the city, or even what she meant by the term "cheating." See El
Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797, 798-99 (Tex. App. Ct. 1986)("Cheating has
no unique definition. It may, in some instances, imply criminal acts; it also serves to
accuse one of unfair dealings. It is not a word which has a precise meaning. It means
different things to different people at different times and in different situations") 
               and The Traditional Cat Association, Inc.  v. Gilbreath,__Cal.App.___(Fourth District,
2004) online at www.courtinfo/ca.gov/opinions/documents/DO4142/PDF at p.  19.
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Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on the plaintiff’s duty to prove falsehood; the number of
cases holding, as a matter of state or federal law, that particular words, while nasty, are
just not of the kind that can be proved true or false boggles the mind of anyone who
began doing this kind of work before l964. Indeed, the cases mix substantial truth with
inability to prove them false in a kind of foggy reinvention of the fact-opinion debate.4
         Diverting these cases  to the states has meant that statements like: “The House
member has a close personal relationship with a Washington lobbyist for the firm....”,
once edited out on both journalistic and legal grounds, now survive.  It was once the
office of libel  per quod to make such statements defamatory; they now appear routinely. 
         The result is probably not quite what the Chief Justice or Justice Kennedy
anticipated, but it is not inconsistent with what they really cared about, the departure of
these cases from their court.  
V.
Bresler and its progeny seem to prove that the dissenters in New York Times were
at least partly correct – the actual malice rule was not broad enough to protect all speech
that deserved protection.  Bresler, Pape, Letter Carriers and Bose all seem to have been
correctly decided. Milkovich is more difficult, but strikes one as wrong, not in its holding
that there was no privilege, and no need for a privilege to protect opinions, but in
concluding that a melee at a sporting event was different from the sound of music in Bose
or the federal report in Pape.  
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The words used by the reporter are a problem; the accusation was that the coach
lied, and context does not serve to soften such a word very much.  This was, however,  a
suit brought by a popular local coach, already vindicated by the system in which he
worked, against a non-local newspaper; the reporter may even have been born outside
Ohio.  Like Commissioner Sullivan, Coach Milkovich was a bully seeking affirmation  by
a jury. 
There is an undercurrent in Milkovich suggesting that the press should get its facts
straight, but facts which occur in an instant are more difficult to get straight than those
gathered from a recording, which can be played over and over again, or a report, which
can be reread.  In terms of the degree of difficulty in translating information gathered by
the senses into a narrative, and that is the rationale of Pape, the kind of reporting done in
Milkovich was more deserving of protection than was the report in Pape or the appraisal
in Bose.  Nonetheless, there is a distinction of sorts among them: Bose is, in form, an
appraisal of an eyewitness event; in Professor Hill’s terms it is an evaluation and so, in a
sense, is the summary of a federal report in Pape.  In contrast,  the reporting in Milkovich
starts out as eyewitness reporting and only eventually shifts to a  judgmental stance.
Perhaps the lack of clear labeling of the shift justifies a distinction of constitutional
stature.  More likely,  Milkovich is a mistake caused by the peculiar baggage which
encumbered the opinion issue.
Masson, the last of the cases, is probably the right result, a conclusion one
reaches on the rhetorical power of Justice Kennedy’s observation that adding quotation
marks is an act which states that no internal mental processing has occurred; it follows
that rules which protect the process of making inferences do not apply here.  So the
canon closed, as it should have, with a case that defines its outer limit by saying,
“however far we go, it will not be this far.”  So read, Masson could be the only set of
words, or, more accurately, quotation marks may be the only set of symbols or words
that are not subjected to a federal constitutional analysis before being declared
defamatory. 
Ollman, while a footnote to these cases, is probably the most difficult of all of them.
If there was a source for the value judgment that “he has no status in the profession....”,
then Judge Bork was correct; the quotation is a way of saying Professor Ollman did not
have enough stature for this particular job, and no one gets to sue for that kind of
evaluation.  If there was no source, the case is harder.  It then looks a lot like Masson,
because if there was no source, the use of quotation marks is inappropriate, even though
here they show not the absence of mental processing but an invention of mental
processing.  If one thinks about it, however, it seems more than unlikely that two
veteran columnists who earn their living by calling sources to get information and
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quotations would abandon their custom and invent a quote.  Why do it when one knows
that most academics love being called and prefer seeing their quotes in print to teaching
their students.  The risk that they made it up is thus extraordinarily small.  Moreover,
one doubts whether it is even useful to know who the source was.  Since there is no
requirement that it have been a knowledgeable source, or even a neutral source, the
name of the source adds essentially nothing.  It is the existence of a source rather than
the name of the source, that is relevant.  But Professor Ollman did not want abstract
information; he wanted, quite humanly, to know who to challenge to a duel.   The
purpose of a libel suit is to avoid dueling, not promote it.   While that is not a wholly
persuasive reason to conclude that Ollman is correctly decided, it tips the balance.
          As for Justice Brennan’s initial impulse to wipe the slate clean, and create a
federal law of which words are defamatory, it is probably a good thing that he aborted
the notion.  One can guess that he thought Bresler a small step in that direction.  But his
first draft did it all at once.  Giving  judges the burden of stating a rationale for what they
were doing beyond his unstated assumption that judges can read language more carefully
that can juries, leaves judges with a great deal of discretion.  Judge Bork said that time
would cure that problem, because the aggregation of cases would eventually allow
someone to describe them in a generalized way.  That grant of early unbounded
discretion bothers Chief Justice Rehnquist; he rejected  of the state court standard of
‘outrageous’ in Falwell  for precisely that reason.
      The effort that began with Bresler foundered on the issue of whether the
Constitution takes away from juries the power to judge the credibility of the author’s
claim that he wrote with a pure state of mind.  But it is that is not the only reason one can
posit for not following the path.   There are, after all, eight centuries of common law in
the present definition how one decides that words are derogatory.  It takes great
determination, or a great case, to overturn that kind of weight.  Unless, of course, one
believes, with Black, Douglas and Goldberg, that the Constitution requires it.  
Moreover, as a structural matter, it would be feel quite odd for the core of all
public defamation cases to be federal law, making them removable as of right to a federal
court.  If there is anything that the opinions in Milkovich and Masson make clear, it is
that the present Court would not a approve of that.  that we should be courageous and
start over, but they do suggest what a difficult task it is.   
That conclusion does not, however, end the matter.  Bresler, Pape, Letter
Carriers, Bose, Falwell and Milkovich are all cases in which a fact-finder could (and
three times did) conclude that the text had been published with knowledge of its probable
falsity.  The accusation by the dissenters in Masson that adding quotation marks was
adequate evidence of knowing falsehood can be made as persuasively in each of the other
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cases.  It follows that all of them, except Milkovich and Masson, stand for the proposition
that some knowingly false speech is to be protected.  It only remains to that give judges
and the people who write the words some idea of when.
VII.  
         Finally, what does the set of cases say about constitutional decision making?   Only
Justice White served through the entire period, and he was consistent; he joined in New
York Times, dissented in Bresler, pointing out its exact departure from what had been
agreed upon, dissented from Gertz because it extended the scope of what had been
agreed upon, concurred in Falwell to bringing emotional distress claims under the New
York Times but suggested the  rest of the opinion was unnecessary, and dissented in
Masson, as if to say we set a standard, it has been met, and we should say so.   Justice
Brennan was there for all but the final case, and he kept the fire burning for protecting
speech that needed protecting .  But the pressure to expand provided by Justices Black,
Douglas and Goldberg, who thought that if Congress could make no law of defamation
neither could they, was gone by 1975.  Their presence surely caused Bresler and Pape,
the cases that establish that some knowingly false speech is protected.  Once they were
gone, replaced by justices less interested in the subject and more attuned to rules like
strict or moderate scrutiny than to a requirement that the Court be the final literary critic
in every defamation case, the canon was likely to end before it could give the
appearance of completion. 
Washington D.C., after all, is not known for sustained attention to any issue. In a
push-pull place like Washington, the Court’s twenty-seven year tussle with speech about
public issues seems like an eon; it is not  easy to make common law in such a place.  
When Justice Brennan gave up the notion of a new federal law of defamation, he
substituted an internal rule requiring the Court to read the language claimed to be
defamatory for itself, disregarding what a trial court or  a jury had done..  Changes in
substantive law may have greater staying power than internal rules because they are
protected by stare decisis and create a constituency that will seek to preserve them,
while procedural rules do not.  Such a  result is not be  surprising:  a group of strong
minded judges seems likely, at some time, to say, ‘what do you mean, I have to think
about these cases in a certain way; I’ll show you, I don’t have to think about them at all.’
And so Masson came to be.
5.Eagleton, After Theory (Basic Books, 2004).
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Or, perhaps, internal rules, especially a territorial rule that marks the limits of the
Court’s power, that defines what judges do, are the most important rules the Court has,
and the debate over them is the most fundamental dispute in which its members engage.
If that is the case, they are rules that can never be settled, and should not be.  
We characterized Justice Brennan’s substitution of a rule changing the relative
roles of judge and jury as a more benign way of dealing with the problem of what to do
with the remand of New York Times.  But if internal rules are really the most powerful
issues the Court deals with, then his change a was more, rather than less, aggressive
expansion of the Court’s territory.  However the Court’s fact finding power had been
used prior to l964, it had not been used to create a whole new tort. 
  Common law defamation is a strict liability tort,  but it allocated the issue of
whether the words are defamatory to a jurors, telling them to decide it as reasonable men
would. New York Times changed all that in a direction precisely contrary to the flow of
the law.   The law of contracts was at the same time busy moving the question of what
the words in contracts mean from judges to juries, Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract
(Ohio State, l960), and deconstruction, the theory which made readers rather than
authors the arbiter of what  words  mean, was beginning its  short lived ascent in the
world of academic criticism.5  In that sense, New York Times was contrarian; the culture
was going in the other direction.
The common law uses juries to decide questions to which we do not know the
answer, or do not know how to think rationally about - what would a reasonable man
have done, shall the defendant die, how much are the punitive damages, did the
corporation have a discriminatory state of mind and the like.   It prefers to have juries
decide issues for which there is no answer available by deduction because then there is
no record if the process which led to the result.  Judge Bork, Justice Stewart and, of
course, Justice Brennan, were willing to allow  judges to exercise the discretion to reach
a result even though they could not cite a minor premise from which it followed.  For
them, that was what judging was about.  They, and with them, students of Llewellyn,
Bickel or Posner know that the power to draw the statement of facts trumps all other
powers.  The internal rule that the Court can in constitutional cases find its own facts is
thus bound to offend any Justice who believes that the simplicity and administrability of
clear cut rules are more important than achieving justice in a particular case.  
Because it vests so much discretion in the court, the power to find facts
6
.The notion that the current court prefers rules to standards is drawn from Mary Ann Case, Are
Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional?  The Equal Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as
a Chapter in the History of Ideas About Law, 70 U. of C L. Rev. 55 (2003).  The debate over
standards for constitutional issues extends  beyond the First Amendment, see Blakely v. 
Washington, __ U.S. __  (June 24, 2004) (Scalia, J.):
   Whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates this manipulable  
standard rather than Apprendi's bright-line rule depends on the
plausibility of the claim that the Framers would have left definition of
the scope of jury power up to judges' intuitive sense of how far is too
far. We think that claim not plausible at all, because the very reason
the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they
were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.
                     For a history of the debate between legal realism and the more formal vision of
judicial thinking, see Dennis J. Hutchison, Elements of the Law, 70 U. of C. L.  Rev.  141 
(2003)(passim), citing, for example,  John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and
Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 Buff. L.  Rev. 459, 480 (1979).
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necessarily conflicts with the Court’s preference for rules rather than standards.6
Standards is, however, simply a  pejorative form of  Professor Alexander Bickel’s more
sympathetic description of what the common law is, Alexander M.  Bickel, The Morality
of Consent (Yale, 1975).  His Whig model “is flexible, pragmatic, slow-moving, highly
political.  It partakes, in substantial measure, of the relativism that pervades Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes theory of the First Amendment....” Ibid., at p. 4. Professor Bickel
thought the alternative way of proceeding, which he called contractarian and attributed to
Locke, “moral, principled, legalistic, ultimately authoritarian.” Ibid., at p. 5.  In that
context, the changes which occurred in this subset of  First Amendment cases are neither
the beginning nor the end of a process which has a long history; the subset, and this
essay, describe only how that debate affected the First Amendment.  
Despite the fundamental difference between the two approaches, the argument is
not the primary issue in very many cases; it is too abstract to have rhetorical force.  The
distinction between the words ‘rule’ and ‘standards’ conveys less of a sense of difference
than does, for example,  the fact-opinion distinction.  One needs an associational aid to
memory, as in ‘Benedictine Rule’, to recall which side is rigid. 
In Milkovich, the lynchpin of the turning in the law described here, the apparent
driving force was the Chief Justice’s attachment to the state’s right to control the central
issue in the law of defamation, rather than any desire to reject a standard.  Nothing
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suggests he was  motivated by a desire to make the scope of the First Amendment turn on
establishing general principles from which one could, top down, deduce results.  He did
not try to impose a rule on the prior cases or to wipe them out; he simply wanted to end
the expansion of a group of cases headed, he thought, in the wrong direction. It was left to
Justice Kennedy, in Masson, to say that Milkovich was not only a refusal to add but that no
similar additions should be contemplated.  Even then, however, he did not disown the past
and did not say that judges could no longer determine the facts in defamation cases.
Taken together, the cases Justice Kennedy left untouched create a constitutional
overlay that defines nearly a whole cause of action.  They govern the meaning of a whole
lot of words, including  words intentionally made ambiguous, the burden to prove falsity
and the proof  required to show fault and damage in all cases in the public arena.  They
come extraordinarily close to creating a pattern of common law adjudication of First
Amendment issues.  But until the Court tells us, directly or by applying it, what remains of
the underlying rule of New York Times, the rule allocating the interesting questions in First
Amendment cases to judges rather than juries, we cannot know whether there is room for
growth as the common law grows. 
Gauged more narrowly, what occurred was a recognition that some statements that can
be proven knowingly false nonetheless deserve protection of the kind an absolute privilege
grants; so put, the cases suggest that Justices Black, Douglas and Goldberg were partly
right, but we’re not up to admitting it yet.  Until we are, the canon remains closed.  
